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SYNTHESIZING AND EXTENDING RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY: A META-
ANALYSIS 
 
Abstract 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) has long been a premier framework for understanding 
organization-environmental relations, but an empirical synthesis of its predictions is still lacking. 
Using meta-analysis, we consolidate 147 tests of RDT and corroborate its main predictions: 
organizations respond to resource dependencies by forming interorganizational arrangements like 
interlocks, alliances, joint ventures, in-sourcing arrangements, and mergers and acquisitions. In 
turn, these arrangements make them more autonomous and more legitimate. We also extend RDT 
in three ways. First, we ‘unpack’ the theory by showing that the mechanisms linking arrangement 
formation to organizational autonomy and legitimacy differ across arrangements. Second, we 
address the question whether RDT is also a theory of organizational performance. We find that 
whereas autonomy positively mediates the relationship between arrangement formation and 
performance, legitimacy does not. This suggests that RDT can also explain organizational actions 
which have societal acceptance rather than economic performance as an ulterior motive. Third, 
we assess whether competition law is a boundary condition to RDT’s prescriptions. Specifically, 
we show that the adoption of the horizontal merger guidelines in the U.S. has caused 
organizations to ‘flee’ from mergers to less regulated arrangements like alliances and joint 
ventures, and has hurt the profitability of the remaining mergers.  
Keywords: Resource Dependence Theory; Meta-analysis; Alliances and Joint Ventures, Mergers 
and Acquisitions; Organizational Autonomy; Organizational Legitimacy; Organizational 
Performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In their landmark publication The External Control of Organizations (1978), Pfeffer and Salancik 
codified and integrated many pre-existing ideas about the management of interorganizational 
interdependencies (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1972a, b, c; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; Thompson, 
1967). Soon after it appeared in print, what they labeled Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) 
became “one of the most influential theories in organizational theory and strategic management” 
(Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009: 1404). RDT is premised on the notion that all organizations 
critically depend on other organizations for the provision of vital resources, and that this 
dependence is often reciprocal. The theory points to such interorganizational interdependencies to 
explain why formally independent organizations engage in different kinds of interorganizational 
arrangements, such as board interlocks, alliances, joint-ventures, in-sourcing, and mergers and 
acquisitions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In turn, these arrangements can help organizations cope 
with interdependencies by bolstering their autonomy (or freedom to make decisions without 
outside interference; Oliver, 1991a) and legitimacy (or presumption of propriety stemming from 
conformity to social guidelines; Suchman, 1995). The attractiveness of these ideas is exemplified 
by the fact that numerous scholars have used RDT as a central explanatory framework for the 
formation of interorganizational arrangements of various kinds (for recent narrative reviews, see: 
Davis & Cobb, 2010; Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
Despite its status as a leading theory for understanding organization-environmental 
relationships, RDT is not as rigorously explored and tested as it could have been (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003: xxxiii). More specifically, RDT is contested on both empirical and conceptual 
grounds (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Davis & Cobb, 2010; Finkelstein, 1997). Empirically, the 
work of RDT scholars has not always produced consistent results. Numerous studies show that 
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resource dependencies indeed tend to result in the formation of interorganizational arrangements 
(e.g. Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Park, Chen, & Gallagher, 2002; Peng, 2004; Pfeffer, 
1972b, c; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976a). However, other studies report insignificant or counter-
hypothesized findings (e.g. Koka & Prescott, 2008; Paruchuri, Nerkar, & Hambrick, 2006; 
Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Conceptually, RDT has been accused of confounding the 
theoretically separate dimensions of power imbalance (or the power differential between two 
organizations; Emerson, 1962) and mutual dependence (or the sum of the dependencies between 
two organizations; Emerson, 1962) in the single construct of interdependence (cf. Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). According to Casciaro and Piskorski, such confounds make that to date RDT “is 
more of an appealing metaphor than a foundation for testable empirical research” (2005: 167). In 
short, the jury is still out in regards to RDT’s potential for predicting interorganizational 
arrangement formation and its consequences. 
Moreover, prior syntheses of RDT have primarily taken the form of narrative reviews, 
which interpret past research findings verbally or conceptually (e.g. Davis & Cobb, 2010; 
Hillman et al., 2009). Whereas narrative reviews are important sensemaking, integrating, and 
agenda-setting tools, they are also vulnerable to biased representations of a body of literature and 
easily lead to false inferences. This is because they do not correct for sampling error, and do not 
offer an inferential statistics-based synthesis of all available findings (Combs, Ketchen, Crook, & 
Roth, 2011). What is currently still lacking is a meta-analytical synthesis of the RDT literature, 
which quantitatively combines all the available empirical evidence (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) and 
which can be a “catalyst for the re-evaluation of established theories and the development of new 
theory” (Combs et al., 2011: 178).   
 In the present paper we report such a meta-analytic study, with which we seek to address 
the aforementioned empirical and conceptual critiques of RDT. Our study has three intended 
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contributions. First, we establish the balance of evidence concerning RDT’s central predictions 
by employing meta-analytic techniques (Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analysis or HOMA; 
Hedges & Olkin, 1985) on a database containing the findings and characteristics of 140 published 
and 7 unpublished studies. Our findings provide aggregated, generalized evidence for RDT’s 
main prediction, notably that resource dependencies – whether operationalized as power 
imbalance or as mutual dependence (cf. Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005) – give rise to 
interorganizational arrangement formation.  
 Second, we use meta-analytic structural equation modeling or MASEM (Aguinis, Dalton, 
Bosco, Pierce, & Dalton, 2011; Cheung & Chan, 2005) to establish the organizational outcomes 
associated with interorganizational arrangement formation. Our path model shows that such 
arrangements can help organizations improve their autonomy (e.g. Davis & Cobb, 2010; Oliver, 
1991a) and legitimacy (Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). But while autonomy is 
also a mediating variable linking arrangement formation to organizational performance (cf. Keil, 
Maula, Schildt, & Zahra, 2008; Luo & Park, 2004; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001), legitimacy is 
not. Arrangement formation can therefore also be seen as a legitimacy seeking strategy with 
societal propriety as its ulterior motive (Hillman et al., 2009). 
 Third, we employ meta-analytic regression analysis or MARA (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; 
Stanley, Doucouliagos, & Jarrell, 2008) to uncover the boundary conditions of RDT. Since 
RDT’s managerial prescriptions frequently stand in a tense relationship to prevailing antitrust 
rules, we test whether the theory’s explanatory power is impacted by major changes in 
competition law. On a subsample of U.S. RDT studies, we find that the passing of stricter anti-
merger legislation causes organizations to seek refuge in other, less regulated types of 
interorganizational arrangements, such as strategic alliances. Also, stricter anti-merger legislation 
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hurts the performance of subsequent mergers and acquisitions, possibly because of the frequent 
demands by anti-trust authorities to divest valuable assets.  
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Resource Dependencies and Interorganizational Arrangement Formation 
The main question addressed by RDT is: why do organizations enter into interorganizational 
arrangements? External dependencies, which in the contemporary business environment can stem 
from factors like increased product market competition because of globalization, limited credit 
supply due to the global financial crisis, and raw materials and energy shortages caused by 
geopolitical shifts in production factor demand, have caused organizations to search for measures 
helping them to restore some degree of control over their environments (Davis & Cobb, 2009). In 
the language of RDT: organizations are “constrained and affected by their environment and act to 
attempt to manage these resource dependencies by setting up different forms of 
interorganizational arrangements” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003: xxxiii). For resource dependence 
theoreticians, interorganizational arrangements are thus primarily seen as instruments for 
reducing power imbalances and for managing mutual dependencies (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005) 
between the focal organization and those parties in its environment on whom it depends for 
critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Implementing such arrangements enables 
organizations to set their boundaries “at the point that maximizes strategic control over crucial 
external forces” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005: 495; italics removed).  
 Resource dependence theoreticians have investigated a variety of interorganizational 
arrangements, each of which is accredited with the capacity to mitigate external resource 
dependencies. For example, board interlocks are conjectured to enhance the cooptation of and 
coordination with important resource providers, primarily by providing a conduit for the 
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exchange of tacit or sensitive information and by providing greater social cohesion between the 
key decision makers representing the interlocked organizations (Mizruchi, 1996). Furthermore, 
alliances and joint ventures are expected to be formed to facilitate reliable and durable access to 
the knowledge and resources of partner organizations. They might also enhance a focal 
organization’s opportunities for developing capabilities and launching new products without 
requiring corresponding investments in a complete and exhaustive resource base (Ahuja, 2000; 
Gulati, 1998). Similarly, interorganizational interdependencies have been identified as a key 
driver of mergers and acquisitions (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Pfeffer, 1972b), as 
acquiring a resource supplier provides durable access to desired inputs, broadens an 
organization’s knowledge base, and facilitates joint strategy formation and implementation. 
Finally, to avoid the integration and capacity problems that are commonly associated with 
mergers and acquisitions (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001), organizations sometimes choose for the 
less invasive option of in-sourcing the production of necessary resources. Numerous empirical 
studies conducted under the banner of RDT have confirmed that resource dependencies are an 
antecedent to arrangements like interlocks (Ellstrand, Tihanyi, & Johnson, 2002), alliances 
(Dussauge et al., 2000; Park et al., 2002), joint ventures (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976a), and mergers 
and acquisitions (Pfeffer, 1972b; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006). We therefore suggest Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Focal organizational resource dependencies are positively associated with 
the formation of interorganizational arrangements like interlocks, alliances, joint ventures, 
in-sourcing, and mergers and acquisitions.  
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Interorganizational Arrangement Formation and Organizational Autonomy 
One of the premier motives a focal organization has to engage in interorganizational 
arrangements is to enhance its autonomy, commonly defined as its “freedom to make its own 
decisions about the use and allocation of its internal resources without reference or regard to the 
demands or expectations of potential linkage partners” (Oliver, 1991a: 944-945). Unmitigated 
resource dependencies negatively affect focal organizational autonomy, because they necessitate 
organizations to commit considerable time and resources to satisfying the demands of external 
resource controlling parties (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Establishing interorganizational 
arrangements can then help focal organizations restore their autonomy (even though such 
attempts to restore autonomy are rarely completely effective, and tend to plant the seed for new 
patterns of interdependence; Hillman et al., 2009), as such arrangements can help stabilize the 
supply of critical resources and address power imbalances between organizations. In short, we 
expect interorganizational arrangement formation to be positively associated with organizational 
autonomy, even though the underlying mechanisms driving this association may differ across 
arrangement types. 
 We expect the autonomy enhancing effect to be strongest for less invasive types of 
interorganizational arrangements such as (contractual) alliances and interlocks, because these 
types can relatively effectively mitigate resource dependencies without creating excessive mutual 
dependencies between the focal organization and the external resource provider (cf. Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005). Alliances and interlocks can stabilize the supply of critical inputs for the focal 
organization by improving the compatibility of its organizational systems with those of the 
reource provider, by incentivizing the joint search for efficiency gains in the resource transfer 
process, and by surrounding the resource exchange relationship with appropriate and effective 
governance mechanisms (Dyer & Singh, 1998). At the same time, alliances and interlocks can 
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usually be terminated without grave (legal) consequences for the focal organization, because 
these “mechanisms extend the organization’s sphere of influence without extending its legal 
boundaries” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005: 496). This allows organizations to preserve their 
strategic flexibility and autonomy, primarily by keeping the option to exit from the 
interorganizational arrangement open (Powell, 1990). See Hypothesis 2a:   
 
Hypothesis 2a: The formation of interlocks and alliances is positively associated with 
focal organizational autonomy. 
 
 For different reasons, we also expect a positive effect of in-sourcing arrangements on 
organizational autonomy. In-sourcing addresses the problem of external resource dependencies 
directly by building an in-house capability for the provision of intermediary products or services 
for which the focal organization used to be dependent on resource providing parties in its 
environment (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995; Lacity & Willcocks, 1998). It therefore does not 
bolster organizational autonomy by cementing an external resource provision relationship and 
making it more reliable or efficient (cf. Dyer & Singh, 1998; cf. Hypothesis 2a), but by a 
mechanism best captured by the logic of buffering (Thompson, 1967). According to this logic, 
organizations can mitigate the potential fluctuations and irregularities in the supply of critical 
inputs from their environment by internalizing their production, such that they can be inserted in 
the organization’s primary production process when they are needed (Thompson, 1967). This 
offers the focal organization greater leeway over its internal resource allocation process, without 
having to cater to the demands of external parties (Oliver, 1991a). See Hypothesis 2b:  
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Hypothesis 2b: The formation of in-sourcing arrangements is positively associated with 
focal organizational autonomy. 
 
A common response to external resource dependencies by focal organizations is to seek 
ownership-based arrangements with crucial resource providers. In the words of Pfeffer and 
Salancik: “One organizational response to interdependence is to absorb it. The available evidence 
on patterns of merger activity among industrial firms is consistent with this position” (1978: 
139). Much like “nonownership mechanisms” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005: 496; italics removed) 
such as interlocks and alliances, “ownership mechanisms” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005: 496; 
italics removed) like joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions can lead to relational advantages 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). Ownership-based arrangements can be premier conduits for 
interorganizational learning (Meyer et al., 2009), they can stabilize resource supply relationships 
(Pfeffer, 1972b), and they foresee in hierarchical forms of governance which allow for the 
resolution of coordination and behavioral problems by fiat (Powell, 1990).  
Yet we expect that the relationship between arrangement adoption and organizational 
autonomy will be decidedly weaker for ownership-based arrangements than for nonownership-
based arrangements, for two interrelated reasons. First, ownership-based arrangements can only 
increase an organization’s sphere of influence at the cost of semi-permanently extending its legal 
boundaries. Joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions all call for substantial and largely 
irreversible equity commitments by the focal organization, depriving it of the possibility to easily 
recuperate these sunk investments and deploy them elsewhere. In other words, the creation of 
semi-permanent equity ties with resource providers produces “new patterns of dependence and 
interdependence” (Hillman et al., 2009: 1405) and limits the strategic flexibility of the focal 
organization (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). Second, over the past three decades, the strategic 
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evolution in many industries has moved away from dependence on a narrow range of resource 
providers “toward a broader set of resource relationships” (Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho, & 
Jackson, 2005: 323). Under such conditions of increasing industry heterogeneity, organizations 
that lock themselves into semi-permanent exclusive relationships with a single resource provider 
reduce their own autonomy by restricting their ability to engage with a more varied set of 
resource providers. In sum, organizations that engage in ownership-based interorganizational 
arrangements might see their autonomy impeded as compared to those restricting themselves to 
nonownership-based arrangements. See Hypothesis 2c: 
 
Hypothesis 2c: The formation of ownership-based arrangements like joint ventures and 
mergers and acquisitions will be more weakly associated with focal organizational 
autonomy than the formation of nonownership-based arrangements like interlocks and 
alliances. 
 
Interorganizational Arrangement Formation and Organizational Legitimacy 
RDT scholars have long been concerned with the effect of interorganizational 
arrangement formation on organizations’ legitimacy, as perceived by critical constituents like 
business partners, investors, regulators, and clients (Certo, 2003; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; 
Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Scott, 
2001). Legitimacy is commonly defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 547). While legitimacy is generally 
seen to possess both strategic and institutional qualities (Suchman, 1995), we focus mainly on the 
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former, and see it as a productive resource that organizations can acquire by engaging in 
dependency reducing strategies (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
The formation of interorganizational arrangements can effectuate greater organizational 
legitimacy in three ways. First, the formation of such arrangements often takes the form of 
bandwagoning behavior shared by many competitors (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993), such 
that participation in arrangement formation can effectuate cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
Especially organizations facing environmental turmoil have a tendency to mimic one another, as 
accessing resources through tried and tested types of arrangements mitigates outcome uncertainty 
and stimulates societal taken-for-grantedness by increasing the overall level of isomorphism in 
the organizational population (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Heugens & Lander, 2009; Scott, 
2001). Second, associations with external actors who themselves possess high levels of 
legitimacy can result in social support for the focal organization, as their legitimacy might ‘rub 
off’ on it (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Bitektine, 2011; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, board 
interlocks and other affiliations with prestigious actors have been argued to help organizations 
undertaking an initial public offering overcome liabilities of market newness by conveying 
signals of legitimacy to investors (Certo, 2003; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010). 
Third, the confusion focal organizations with partial membership of multiple producer categories 
tend to create in the eyes of their audiences may be attenuated when they cooperate with actors 
who are singularly affiliated with one of these producer categories (Hsu, 2006; Rindova, Pollock, 
& Hayward, 2006). Such focal organizations with hybrid identities can thus improve their 
legitimacy by associating themselves with full members in legitimated categories (Hannan, 
2010). In sum, we expect that the formation of interorganizational arrangements which establish 
a visible link between the focal organization and an external resource provider will have a 
positive effect on focal organizational legitimacy. See Hypothesis 3a: 
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Hypothesis 3a: The formation of interlocks, alliances, joint ventures, and mergers and 
acquisitions is positively associated with focal organizational legitimacy. 
 
 Not all resource dependency reducing strategies involve the creation of an externally 
perceivable tie with a resource-controlling organization, however. The case in point is the in-
sourcing arrangement, which involves a focal organizational effort to build an in-house capability 
for the supply of crucial resources. In-sourcing may effectively mitigate focal-organizational 
resource dependencies, as it minimizes focal organizations’ reliance on external parties (Lacity & 
Hirschheim, 1995; Lacity & Willcocks, 1998). Furthermore, such a substantive organizational 
response to resource dependencies may be perceived by external constituents as a desirable or 
proper way of dealing with external constraints, such that it can simultaneously constitute a 
symbolic response to institutional pressures (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). But since in-sourcing 
does not liaise the focal organization with external parties, it cannot be a conduit for legitimacy 
spillovers from legitimate outsiders to the focal organization. We therefore expect in-sourcing to 
be less strongly linked with focal organizational legitimacy than arrangement types that 
perceivably link the organization to influential outside resource providers. See Hypothesis 3b: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The formation of relatively inconspicuous arrangements for managing 
focal-organizational resource dependencies, like in-sourcing, will be less strongly 
associated with focal organizational legitimacy than the formation of highly visible 
arrangements, like interlocks, alliances, joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions. 
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Organizational Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Performance 
An open question at this point is whether RDT is also a theory of organizational 
performance. On the one hand, securing organizational autonomy (Thompson, 1967) and 
organizational legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) can be seen as ulterior motives in their own right. 
Two fundamental premises of RDT are that organizations purposely strive to avoid the loss of 
decision-making autonomy (Oliver, 1991a), and actively seek legitimacy in order to stabilize 
their relations with resource-providing parties beyond their formal control (Oliver, 1991b). This 
view highlights RDT’s roots in organizational sociology, and gears it towards explaining patterns 
of organizational responsiveness to external demands and expectations. On the other hand, a 
substantial group of scholars have also incorporated an additional premise in RDT, notably that 
organizations are interest-driven and profit-seeking (e.g. Pfeffer, 1972b; Villalonga & McGahan, 
2005; Weitz & Shenhav, 2000). This alternative view highlights RDT’s congruence with 
organizational economics-based approaches, and frames it as a theory of strategic management 
capable of explaining performance differentials between organizations. In the present paper we 
confront these two views by assessing whether organizational autonomy and legitimacy are 
mediating variables between interorganizational arrangement formation and organizational 
performance, or whether the path towards performance stops at these two variables. 
Oliver (1991a: 945-946) has identified three mechanisms that can possibly produce a 
positive association between organizational autonomy and performance. First, greater autonomy 
allows focal organizations to more effectively meet the demands of multiple resource providing 
parties simultaneously (cf. David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; Hambrick et al., 2005). Exercising 
this ability to meet multiple resource providers’ concerns makes it more likely that they will 
jointly continue to make the resources under their control available to the focal organization on 
favorable terms. Second, a strong position of organizational autonomy provides focal 
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organizations with the capacity they need to respond to future unforeseen contingencies. Such 
responsiveness can help focal organizations maintain their relationships with important exchange 
partners when these relationships are threatened by salient issues (Ingram & Simons, 1995). 
Third, the relationship between resource provider and focal organization is typically vulnerable to 
problems involving self-benefiting actions like free riding and hold up on behalf of the former, to 
the detriment of the latter (Ketchen & Hult, 2007). The more autonomous the position of the 
focal organization, however, the more likely it is that the temptation towards self-serving 
behaviors on behalf of such resource providers can be overcome. In short, we expect that, to the 
extent that interorganizational arrangement formation gives rise to greater focal organizational 
autonomy (cf. Hypotheses 2a and 2b), this autonomy in turn will provide additional opportunities 
for bettering focal organizational performance. See Hypothesis 4a:   
 
Hypothesis 4a: The relationship between interorganizational arrangement formation and 
focal organizational performance is positively mediated by focal organizational 
autonomy. 
 
Furthermore, three arguments support the view that legitimate organizations are better 
able than their deviant counterparts to better their performance by attracting resources of higher 
quality and at more favorable terms (Heugens & Lander, 2009). First, resource providers prefer to 
liase with organizations of impeccable social standing, because such linkages tend not to threaten 
their reputation for sound judgment (Baum & Oliver, 1991). Second, legitimate focal 
organizations almost by definition have strategies that are seen as “rational” against the 
background of prevailing institutional logics, which buttresses the confidence they muster from 
resource providers (Deephouse, 1999). Third, focal organizations that are seen as legitimate are 
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also seen as understandable and reliable (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), such that resource providers 
tend to think of them as less prone to failure because of unanticipated risks. In sum, we expect 
that when the formation of interorganizational arrangements effectuates greater focal 
organizational legitimacy (cf. Hypothesis 3a), this legitimacy will subsequently contribute to 
stronger focal organizational performance. See Hypothesis 4b:   
 
Hypothesis 4b: The relationship between interorganizational arrangement formation and 
focal organizational performance is positively mediated by focal organizational 
legitimacy. 
 
Moderating Effects of Antitrust Legislation 
 While RDT theoreticians see interorganizational arrangements like joint ventures and 
mergers and acquisitions as important instruments for mitigating resource dependencies, antitrust 
authorities have long looked upon such arrangements with suspicion. In particular, they see them 
as having the potential to reduce market competition by enhancing the market power of the 
liaising parties, and by dulling the pressure of competitive processes like quality-based 
differentiation and price wars (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976b). The possible consequences of such 
anti-competitive behaviors, to which antitrust authorities are particularly alert, are that consumers 
are presented with dead-weight losses due to monopolistic pricing and with slowing product 
innovation due to underinvestment in research and development (Shapiro, 2010). National 
governments like that of the U.S. and supranational institutions like the European Commission 
(EC) have therefore long been keen to prevent corporate positions of market dominance by 
regulating the formation of interorganizational arrangements through antitrust legislation.  
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While all interorganizational arrangements can in principle be used as vehicles for 
collusion, antitrust legislation is primarily intended to prevent the formation of positions of 
market dominance through mergers and acquisitions. Primary studies suggest that while the 
passing of the Celler-Kefauver amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1950 in 
the U.S. was meant to reduce the number of horizontal mergers that would “substantially lessen 
competition, or tend to create a monopoly” (Matsusaka, 1996: 286), it also resulted in a reduction 
of the number of vertical mergers (Finkelstein, 1997; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976b). The act 
prohibited the acquisition of competitors’ assets, even those that did not have anti-competitive 
potential, thus reducing the number of potentially value-creating interorganizational 
arrangements formed. To correct for this unwanted side-effect, the U.S. government introduced 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act in 1976, ensuring a thirty-day waiting period 
following a proposed merger. During this period, the Federal Trade Commission assesses 
whether the proposed transaction is acceptable under prevailing antitrust legislation and thus has 
no grave anticompetitive implications. With the passing of this Act, Congress hoped to only 
reduce the number of mergers with antitrust implications, while allowing for mergers with a 
positive impact on national competitiveness and innovativeness. New guidelines were introduced 
in 1992, when the Bush Sr. administration wanted to further enhance the competitiveness of the 
U.S. economy by making it even more difficult to engage in anticompetitive mergers, while still 
allowing universal, pro-competitive mergers.  
We expect that the passing of stricter antitrust provisions, which tend to be focused 
primarily on preventing collusion through mergers and acquisitions, has two complementary 
effects. First, we expect it to result in a diminished popularity of mergers and acquisitions as 
vehicles for mitigating resource dependencies. Second, other types of interorganizational 
arrangements, which tend to be less strictly regulated, are likely to be used as substitutes for 
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mergers and acquisitions (cf. Hillman et al., 2009). Thus, we expect to observe an increase in the 
adoption rate of other interorganizational arrangement types as antitrust provisions become 
tighter, as organizations try to reduce their resource dependencies using strategies that are less 
dependent on the approval of antitrust authorities. See Hypotheses 5a and 5b1: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: The relationship between focal organizational resource dependencies and 
the formation of mergers and acquisitions is negatively moderated by the passing of 
stricter antitrust legislation. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: The relationship between focal organizational resource dependencies and 
the formation of interlocks, alliances, and joint ventures is positively moderated by the 
passing of stricter antitrust legislation. 
 
Anti-trust legislation does not only affect the formation of interorganizational 
arrangements, however, but also their profitability (Luo, 2005). Recent research has 
demonstrated that legal institutions affect liaising organizations’ market share and financial 
returns (Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2011; Ellis, Reus, & 
Lamont, 2009). More in particular, when organizations are obliged by law to divest synergetic 
parts of an acquired target or to invest heavily in meeting new compliance demands, extra costs 
and losses result and lucrative investment opportunities have to be foregone (Hitt & Ireland, 
1985). We therefore expect to observe that when antitrust provisions become stricter, the 
profitability of mergers and acquisitions will decline. Furthermore, stricter antitrust legislation 
regulating merger and acquisition activity may also result in organizations exerting greater effort 
to extract relational advantages from substitute arrangements like interlocks and alliances (cf. 
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Dyer & Singh, 1998). This move away from exclusive and semi-permanent ownership-based 
arrangements like mergers and acquisitions towards more inclusive and temporary 
nonownership-based arrangements like interlocks and alliances can result in substantive benefits 
for focal organizations. Exploring such substitute arrangements allows them to enlarge both their 
strategic flexibility (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005) and their capacity for dealing with increasingly 
heterogeneous resource dependencies (Hambrick et al., 2005). We therefore also expect to find 
that stricter antitrust provisions will increase the profitability of interorganizational arrangement 
types other than mergers and acquisitions. See Hypotheses 6a and 6b:  
 
Hypothesis 6a: The relationship between merger and acquisition formation and focal 
organizational performance is negatively moderated by the passing of stricter antitrust 
legislation. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: The relationship between interlock, alliance and joint venture formation 
and focal organizational performance is positively moderated by the passing of stricter 
antitrust legislation. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Literature Search 
To identify primary studies on RDT, we used four complementary literature retrieval 
procedures. First, we explored eight electronic databases: ABI/INFORM Global, Blackwell 
Synergy, EBSCO, EconLit, Google Scholar, ISI Web of Knowledge, JSTOR and SSRN. We 
used the following keywords: “resource dependence (theory),” “environmental uncertainty,” 
“interlock,” “alliance,” “joint venture,” “in-sourcing,” “merger and/or acquisition,” “autonomy,” 
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“legitimacy,” and “performance.” Second, we conducted a manual search of all articles published 
from 1999 to 2009 in nine top-tier journals: Academy of Management Journal, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, Journal of 
Management, Journal of Management Studies, Organization Science, Organization Studies, and 
Strategic Management Journal. Third, we examined the reference lists of all previously identified 
articles to identify further related studies. Fourth, we corresponded via e-mail with the authors of 
all studies represented in the primary data set, asking them to send us related published and 
unpublished work. As several of our initial studies did not report effect size data, we asked the 
authors of these studies whether they would be willing to send us effect size information in the 
form of a correlation table. Since a considerable number of these studies were over a decade old, 
many authors reported that the original data sets had been lost. Nevertheless, one of the authors 
managed to send us a correlation table, bringing our final sample up to 147 studies (see the 
Appendix for bibliographic information). 
 
Criteria for Inclusion 
We used two heuristics to decide which studies to include in the meta-analysis (Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985). First, a study had to report relationships between resource dependence and 
interorganizational arrangement formation, or between arrangement formation and organizational 
autonomy, legitimacy, or performance. It was not necessary for these relationships to be the main 
theoretical focus of the primary study to be included in our meta-analysis, only that a correlation 
between the variables of interest should be available. Second, a study had to report sample sizes 
as well as effect size estimates (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). When a study 
reported separate effect sizes for multiple dimensions of a construct (e.g. when a study reported 
effects on both the market and accounting dimensions of performance), we included each effect 
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in the analysis on account of it reflecting a separate dimension. The effect size data used in this 
study are Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. Table 1 summarizes definitions for 
our core constructs, as well as a set of representative operationalizations. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
HOMA Procedure 
To compile the meta-analytic correlation table necessary for testing Hypotheses 1, 2a-c, 
3a and b, and 4a and b through MASEM, we used HOMA (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Whereas in 
the behavioral branches of the management field artifact-correcting meta-analytical techniques 
are currently more popular (cf. Hunter & Schmidt, 2004), we apply HOMA because a large 
majority of our included primary studies relies on archival data. When primary studies are not 
affected by statistical artifacts like range restriction and psychometric measurement error, HOMA 
is the more parsimonious and robust alternative, as it merely corrects effect sizes for sample size-
related differences in precision (Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp, & Chunha, 2009). We also 
correct for skewness in the effect size distribution by applying Fisher’s z-transformations2 
(Geyskens et al., 2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). To make our analyses less sensitive to outliers, 
we furthermore winsorized the effect size distribution (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) by bringing back 
effect sizes that were more than 3.0 standard deviations away from the mean correlation to that 
cut-off point. 
When applying HOMA, meta-analysts furthermore have to make a choice for either fixed 
or random effects-based approaches for computing mean effect sizes. Like in most other meta-
analyses of ‘macro’ theories (Combs et al., 2011), the heterogeneity of our effect size distribution 
is substantial, such that the retrieved mean effect size is best interpreted as an average rather than 
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as a common true correlation value (Hedges & Olkin, 1985: 235). Under these conditions, 
random effects models must be preferred over fixed effects approaches, as the former yield more 
conservative estimates of the focal effect with more realistic Type II error rates (Geyskens et al., 
2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).  
When studies offer multiple operationalizations of focal constructs like resource 
dependence or organizational performance, a single study might offer multiple estimates of the 
same focal effect. Meta-analysts then face a decision whether to separately include all estimates 
in the analysis or represent each individual study by a single value, such as an average or a 
single-best indicator. Monte Carlo studies show that meta-analysts ought to prefer completeness 
of information over stochastic independence of effect sizes, as meta-analyses that contain all 
measurements of the focal effect tend to outperform procedures representing studies by a single 
value in crucial aspects like mean effect estimation accuracy and confidence interval computation 
precision (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001).  
We check for the robustness of our HOMA results in three ways. First, to diagnose 
whether stochastical dependencies between effect sizes affected the focal relationship, we tested 
whether the meta-analytic mean for studies reporting only a single effect size differed from that 
retrieved from studies reporting multiple effects. Second, to detect any moderating effects 
attributable to differences in operationalization of the independent variable across studies, we 
separate resource dependence measures into those capturing power imbalance and those 
capturing mutual dependence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Third, to detect possible moderating 
effects related to differences in operationalization of the dependent variable across studies, we 
separate organizational performance into accounting-based performance (e.g. measured as ROA, 
ROE, ROI) and market-based performance (e.g. measured as cumulative abnormal returns, 
Tobin’s Q, and market-to-book ratio). 
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MASEM Procedure 
To test Hypotheses 1, 2a-c, 3a and b, and 4a and b, we relied on MASEM (Cheung & 
Chan, 2005; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995), which uses a two-stage procedure. First, mean 
correlations between variables of interest are established through separate HOMA analyses. 
Second, structural equations modeling is applied on the matrix of mean correlations, using full 
information maximum likelihood estimation routines (Cheung & Chan, 2005). A key advantage 
of MASEM is that it can properly test a system of equations in which key variables act both as 
dependent and as independent variables (which is the case in our study with the 
interorganizational arrangement formation variables), while accounting for the influence of 
control variables and correcting for simultaneity biases (Geyskens et al., 2009).  
 In our system of equations, we incorporated four control variables, which capture 
frequently used alternative explanations for interorganizational arrangement formation and 
organizational performance. First, we control for organization size, as larger organizations are 
likely to be more frequently involved in interorganizational arrangements and may be able to 
create and appropriate more value through economies of scale and market power (Agardi & 
Bauer, 2008; Merchant & Schendel, 2000). Second, we include organization age, as 
organizations in the earlier stages of their life-cycle need to offset greater resource dependencies, 
such that they possibly benefit more from interorganizational linkages than more mature firms 
(Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Stuart, 2000). Third, we incorporate the debt/equity ratio, 
primarily because differences in organizations’ capital structures are known to affect their 
choices between various types of interorganizational arrangements and to influence their 
performance through the mechanism of leverage (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Pfeffer, 1972c). Fourth, 
we control for prior ties, as prior tie formation expedites subsequent interorganizational 
arrangement formation and focal organizational performance through partner-specific and 
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generic learning (Brannick, 1995; Kale, Dyer & Singh, 2002; Zollo, Reuer & Singh, 2002). We 
estimate our path model using the following eight equations: 
 
(1) Interlock = β1 resource dependence + β2 age +  β3 size + β4 prior ties + ε 
(2) Alliance = β5 resource dependence + β6 age +  β7 size + β8 prior ties + ε 
(3) Joint venture = β9 resource dependence + β10 age +  β11 size + β12 prior ties + ε 
(4) In-sourcing = β13 resource dependence + β14 age +  β15 size + β16 prior ties +  ε 
(5) Merger = β17 resource dependence + β18 age +  β19 size + β20 prior ties +  ε 
(6) Organizational autonomy = β21 resource dependence + β22 age +  β23 size + β24 prior ties + 
β25 debt/equity ratio + β26 interlock + β27 alliance + β28 joint venture  + β29 in-sourcing + β30 
merger + ε 
(7) Organizational legitimacy = β31 resource dependence + β32 age +  β33 size + β34 prior ties + 
β35 debt/equity ratio + β36 interlock + β37 alliance + β38 joint venture  + β39 in-sourcing + β40 
merger + ε 
(8) Organizational performance = β41 resource dependence + β42 age +  β43 size + β44 prior ties 
+ β45 debt/equity ratio + β46 interlock + β47 alliance + β48 joint venture  + β49 in-sourcing + 
β50 merger + β51 organizational autonomy + β52 organizational legitimacy + ε 
 
We tested this system of equations in LISREL 8.80. To account for sample size differences 
across the various cells of the meta-analytic correlation table, we used the harmonic mean sample 
size as the overall sample size of our analyses (N = 9,840), which is less sensitive to outliers and 
more conservative than the arithmetic mean sample size.  
 
Resource Dependence Theory: A Meta-Analysis 
 
25 
 
Procedure for Moderator Analysis 
To test Hypotheses 5a and b and 6a and b, we used MARA (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
This technique is designed to assess the relationship between effect size and moderator variables 
by modeling heterogeneity in the effect size distribution (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). In MARA, 
effect sizes are weighted by the inversed variance weight w to account for differences in 
precision (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). MARA is a modified type of WLS regression, which prevents 
statistical analysis programs from interpreting these weights as “representing multiple effect sizes 
rather than weightings of single effect sizes” (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001: 122). As scholars are 
concerned about the inaccuracy of fixed-effects models (Geyskens et al., 2009), we use a more 
conservative mixed-effects specification, which attributes effect size variability to systematic 
between-study differences, firm-level sampling error, and an unmeasured random component 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The MARA analyses reported here are conducted on a subsample 
containing only U.S. data, for reasons explained in Footnote 1. 
In our analysis we included 10 dummy variables, each capturing a specific type of 
interorganizational arrangement during the era in which a certain antitrust act was in place. To 
assign each longitudinal sample to a unique era, we computed the median sample year for each 
sample, and assigned it to the era encompassing that year. The first two dummy variables capture 
interlocks and mergers and acquisitions in the 1950 – 1975 era. They capture the moderating 
effect of the passing of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Antitrust Act of 
1914 on the relationships between focal organizational resource dependencies and 
interorganizational arrangement formation (cf. Hypotheses 5a and b) and between arrangement 
formation and focal organizational performance (cf. Hypotheses 6a and b). For this first era, we 
could not include dummy variables for alliance and JV formation, due to a lack of available 
effect sizes. The next four dummy variables code for arrangement type during the 1976 – 1991 
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era, which commenced with the passing of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976. Our last four 
dummy variables denote arrangement types during the 1992 to present day era, which started 
with the 1992 passing of modernized antitrust guidelines by the Bush Sr. administration. For our 
arrangement type dummy variables, we always use in-sourcing as the reference category (also see 
Footnote 1).  
We furthermore included two sets of dummy variables to control for substantive factors: 
(1) Organizational type: “public” and “private or mixed” (reference category), to test for the 
moderating effect of transacting with agencies of the state (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Heugens 
& Lander, 2009; Tolbert, 1985); and (2) Industry type: “manufacturing,” “technology,” 
“services,” or “mixed” (reference category), to assess whether the associational strength of our 
two focal relationships differed between industries.  
Finally, we included seven methodological moderators, to assess whether differences in 
studies’ research methods and publication characteristics explained additional heterogeneity in 
the effect size distribution: (1) Observation plan: “cross-sectional” or “longitudinal” (reference 
category); (2) Survey dummy: “survey” or “archival” (reference category), to test whether studies 
based on self-reported data produced results that differed from those using archival data; (3) 
Single measurement dummy: to test whether the findings of studies which only reported a single 
measurement of the focal effect differed from those reporting multiple measurements (reference 
category); (4) Publication status: “published” or “unpublished” (reference category), to test for 
the presence of file drawer problems (Rosenthal, 1979); (5) Publication year, to correct for 
otherwise unmodeled time effects; (6) Performance type: “legitimacy,” “market based,” or 
“accounting based” (reference category); and (7) Publication outlet: “AMJ,” “ASQ,” “JMS,” 
“OS,” “SMJ,” or “other” (reference category), to detect the presence of confirmatory publication 
biases across various journals.  
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RESULTS 
HOMA Results 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix, which serves as input for our subsequent MASEM 
procedure. In the cells below the diagonal, mean correlations (meanρ) and standard deviations 
(s.d.ρ) are presented for each relationship. The cells above the diagonal show the total number of 
observations (N) and the total number of samples (k) on which the mean correlation is based. 
Table 2 reports 78 mean correlations, all of which were established via independent HOMA 
analyses. In other words, the value in each of the 78 cells captures a correlation computed from 
real underlying data, rather than an approximated or simulation-based number.  
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
MASEM Results 
Table 3 presents the MASEM results for Hypotheses 1, 2a-c, 3a and b, and 4a and b. The 
model fits the data well (Chi-square = 1,755.67; RMSEA = .04; RMR = .00; GFI = .98). The 
results confirm Hypothesis 1: resource dependence is positively related to the formation of 
interlocks (β = .08; p < .001), alliances (β = .08; p < .001), joint ventures (β = .07; p < .001), in-
sourcing (β = .15; p < .001) and mergers and acquisitions (β = .09; p < .001)3. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are similarly confirmed: the formation of interlocks (β = .19; p < 
.001) and alliances (β = .21; p < .001) is positively related to focal organizational autonomy, and 
so are in-sourcing arrangements (β = .04; p < .001). In contrast, but in line with the expectations 
expressed in Hypothesis 2c, the relationship between the formation of ownership-based 
interorganizational arrangements (which encompass significant equity commitments on behalf of 
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the focal organization) and focal organizational autonomy is weaker than that for nonownership-
based arrangements. Concretely, two types of analyses provide support for Hypothesis 2c. First, 
in our MASEM analysis (Table 3), the only two arrangement types lacking a significant 
relationship with focal organizational autonomy are joint ventures (β = -.01; p > .10) and mergers 
and acquisitions (β = -.00; p > .10). Second, our HOMA analyses (Table 2) show that the 
associational strength of the relationship between arrangement formation and focal organizational 
autonomy is considerably greater for nonownership arrangements than for ownership 
arrangements. Formal Feingold (1992) z-tests for the comparison of meta-analytic mean 
differences show that the effect for interlocks (mean ρ = .11) is significantly greater than that for 
joint ventures (mean ρ = .05; z = 14.63; p < .001) and mergers and acquisitions (mean ρ = .06; z = 
13.82; p < .001). Similarly, the effect for alliances (mean ρ = .19) is also significantly greater 
than that for joint ventures (z = 51.81; p < .001) and mergers and acquisitions (z = 50.66; p < 
.001). Finally, the effect for in-sourcing (mean ρ = .08) is likewise significantly greater than that 
for joint ventures (z = 5.36; p < .001) and mergers and acquisitions (z = 3.94; p < .001). . 
The MASEM results similarly support Hypothesis 3a. The formation of interlocks (β = 
.13; p < .05), alliances (β = .45; p < .001), joint ventures (β = .14; p < .001), and mergers and 
acquisitions (β = .12; p < .001) is positively related to focal organizational legitimacy. Congruent 
with the logic formalized in Hypothesis 3b, the relationship between the formation of 
inconspicuous arrangements like in-sourcing and focal organizational legitimacy is weaker than 
that for more visible arrangements. Two types of analyses provide corroboratory evidence. First, 
in our MASEM analysis (Table 3), in-sourcing is the only one of the five arrangement types we 
explore that does not stand in a positively significant relationship to focal organizational 
legitimacy (β = -.03; p > .05). Second, our HOMA analyses (Table 2) similarly show that the 
associational strength of the relationship between arrangement formation and focal organizational 
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legitimacy is significantly weaker for in-sourcing (mean ρ = .01) than for interlocks (mean ρ = 
.09; z = 9.77; p < .001), alliances (mean ρ = .23; z = 40.75; p < .001), joint ventures (mean ρ = 
.10; z = 8.41; p < .001), and mergers and acquisitions (mean ρ = .10; z = 12.39; p < .001). 
We furthermore found a strong positive association between organizational autonomy and 
organizational performance (β = .12; p < .001). Formal Sobel tests (MacKinnon, Warsi, & 
Dwyer, 1995) for statistical mediation showed that autonomy is a significant mediating variable 
for the paths linking interlocks (z = 2.47; p < .01), alliances (z = 3.16; p < .001), and mergers and 
acquisitions (z = 2.05; p < .05) to organizational performance. These results confirm Hypothesis 
4a. We did not find a statistically significant relationship between organizational legitimacy and 
organizational performance (β = .02; p > .10), however. Since the absence of a significant unique 
effect of the mediator on the dependent variable implies a violation of one of the necessary 
conditions for statistical mediation (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986), Hypothesis 4b is rejected. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
MARA Results 
The results pertaining to Hypotheses 5a and b and Hypothesis 6a and b are presented in 
Table 4. The Table reports the results of four complementary mixed-effects WLS regressions, 
which model the moderating influence of variables on the relationships between resource 
dependence and interorganizational arrangement formation (Models 1 and 2) and between 
interorganizational arrangement formation and firm performance (Models 3 and 4). Model 1 and 
3 report the results for our substantive and methodological control variables only, the other 
models include our predictor variables.  
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-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Models 1 and 2 fit the data well, with R2 values of .23 and .25. The insignificant result for 
the Q-test for the residual component of the model suggests that the variance in the effect size 
distribution is sufficiently modeled, and that there are no major moderation effects left that are 
unaccounted for (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Hypothesis 5a is not supported. The passing of stricter 
antitrust legislation has not affected the prevalence of mergers and acquisitions. In contrast, our 
moderator tests do provide support for Hypothesis 5b. The passing of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines positively moderated the relationship between resource dependence and the formation 
of interlocks (β = .19; p <.01), alliances (β = .11; p <.05), and joint ventures (β = .10; p <.05), 
suggesting the presence of substitution effects between mergers and acquisitions and other types 
of arrangements.  
The fit of Models 3 and 4 is good. However, the significant Q-statistic for residual 
variance suggests substantive moderator variables are possibly unaccounted for (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001). This may be attributable to the fact that meta-analytic data is collected at the 
sample level rather than the subject (i.e., organizational) level, such that we could not include 
known organizational-level moderator and contingency variables such as organizational size, age, 
and diversification. The R2 of Model 3 is .33 and of Model 4 .39. The results provide support for 
Hypothesis 6a. The relationship between merger and acquisition formation and organizational 
performance is negatively influenced by the passing of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1992 
(β = -.12; p < .001). However, Hypothesis 6b is not supported, as the passing of antitrust 
legislation has not affected the performance of interlocks, alliances, and joint ventures. Overall, 
these findings suggest that it has become increasingly hard for organizations to ensure the 
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profitability of mergers and acquisitions over time, possibly because the tightening of anti-
competition laws has made it more difficult for them to use these arrangements as vehicles for 
collusion and other forms of anti-competitive behavior.  
Several checks demonstrate the robustness of our results. First, the meta-analytic mean 
effect retrieved from studies reporting only a single effect size does not differ from that computed 
from studies reporting multiple effects. Thus, possible stochastical dependencies between effect 
sizes harvested from a single study do not appear to drive our research findings. Second, in 
Models 1 and 2, no moderating effect could be detected resulting from differential 
operationalizations of resource dependence. Both power imbalance and mutual dependence have 
very similar effects on interorganizational arrangement formation (also see Table 2; the mean 
effects are .10 vs. .10). Third, in Models 3 and 4, no moderating effect was discerned for alternate 
operationalizations of organizational performance, as the effect of studies choosing for either a 
market or an accounting performance-based operationalization was immaterial (see Table 4). 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Summary of the Results  
In this study, we have synthesized the currently available body of evidence on RDT. Our 
MASEM results corroborate all hypotheses that were most directly derived from the original 
codification of RDT by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), such that their basic model remains intact. 
Specifically, resource dependencies lead to the formation of interorganizational arrangements 
(Hypothesis 1), which in turn strengthen focal organizational autonomy (Hypotheses 2a and b) 
and legitimacy (Hypothesis 3a). Autonomy is furthermore a significant mediating variable on the 
path connecting interorganizational arrangements with focal organizational performance 
(Hypothesis 4a). In short, when judged by the criterion of statistical significance (the yardstick 
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used in MASEM), our results are consistent with RDT as it was formulated by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978). 
But while the level of support for RDT’s hypothesized results is encouraging, it must be 
noted that the cumulated effects we retrieved (the yardstick used in HOMA) are small by 
conventional standards for establishing the magnitude of effect sizes (Cohen, 1988). For 
example, the mean effects for the relationship between resource dependence and arrangement 
formation range from .08 (alliances) to .17 (interlocks). Similarly, for the relationship between 
arrangement formation and autonomy the range extends from .05 (joint ventures) to .19 
(alliances), and from .01 (in-sourcing) to .23 (alliances) for the relationship between arrangement 
formation and legitimacy. Yet these ranges are quite comparable to those recently retrieved for 
other macro management theories (Combs et al., 2011), such as institutional theory (predicting 
the effect of institutional forces on isomorphism; .07 - .08; Heugens & Lander, 2009), transaction 
cost theory (predicting the effect of transaction characteristics on hierarchical governance; -.08 - 
.16; Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006), and resource-based theory (predicting the effect of 
resource characteristics on organizational performance; .09 - .23; Crook, Ketchen, Combs, & 
Todd, 2008). In other words, RDT’s explanatory power is on par with that of other major 
approaches in the relevant comparison group of macro organizational theories (Combs et al., 
2011). Our results thus support the theory’s current status as a premier perspective for 
understanding organizational-environmental relations (cf. Hillman et al., 2009).  
 
Unpacking RDT 
Yet our fine-grained results demonstrate that not all types of interorganizational 
arrangements are equally suitable for coping with resource dependencies, as some have greater 
positive autonomy and legitimacy enhancing effects than others, and only three arrangements 
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types are linked to organizational performance via the mediating channel of organizational 
autonomy. In part, these differential effects may be attributable to the fact that these 
arrangements differ in terms of their rationale and intended outcomes. Interlocks may be 
introduced more for advice and counsel than for resource control, and they may prove useful 
primarily in providing access to channels of information between organizations (Davis, 1996). 
Through the formation of alliances and joint ventures, organizations seek to resolve 
environmental uncertainties and resource supply problems while retaining their legal 
independence (Koza & Lewin, 1998). In-sourcing arrangements allow organizations to manage 
resource dependencies through buffering-type mechanisms (Thompson, 1967), but they lack the 
legitimacy bestowing effect of the other arrangement types. Mergers and acquisitions, finally, are 
often sought for reasons of interorganizational complementarity, even though the rationale for 
many mergers can only be found in the boardroom, in the form of CEOs’ hubris, narcissism, and 
striving for personal gain (Roll, 1986).  
 On the whole, our results show that in choosing a type of interorganizational arrangement 
to manage and alleviate resource dependencies, organizations must make two separate 
considerations. First, if they are primarily interested in improving their autonomy (cf. Oliver, 
1991a), they must choose for interorganizational arrangement types which preserve strategic 
flexibility (Gerwin, 1993; Hillman et al., 2009; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). In this regard, a 
distinction must be drawn between less invasive nonownership-based arrangements like 
interlocks, alliances, and in-sourcing arrangements on the one hand, and flexibility-rupturing 
ownership-based arrangements like joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions on the other. The 
equity commitments involved in the latter types appear to stand in the way of autonomy 
improvements. Second, if organizations are primarily interested in improving their legitimacy (cf. 
Suchman, 1995), they must choose for interorganizational arrangement types which create highly 
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visible linkages with reputed outsiders (Certo, 2003; Pollock et al., 2010). In contrast, in-sourcing 
arrangements may be instrumental in terms of countering resource dependencies, but since they 
do not liaise the focal organization with admired external constituents, they cannot act as a 
conduit for positive legitimacy spillovers.  
  
RDT as a Theory of Organizational Performance 
Our results provide a mixed answer to the question whether RDT is also a theory of 
organizational performance. On the one hand, we found considerable support for our Hypothesis 
4a, which conveyed the logic that organizational autonomy is not an end unto itself for many 
organizations, but rather a mediating variable connecting interorganizational arrangement 
formation to focal organizational performance. Especially on the paths linking the formation of 
interlocks, alliances, and mergers and acquisitions to performance, autonomy manifested itself as 
a significant mediating variable (see Table 3). In contrast, focal organizational autonomy did not 
significantly mediate the relationships between in-sourcing and joint venture formation and focal 
organizational performance, suggesting that these paths lend themselves less well for capturing 
the type of gains autonomy brings, such as appeasing multiple resource providers simultaneously 
or preventing holdup problems. On the whole, however, our results for focal organizational 
autonomy are congruent with a portrayal of RDT as a theory in which organizational interests 
occupy a central position, and in which profit-seeking is an important organizational objective 
(Oliver, 1991b). In short, they support a view of RDT as a theory of organizational performance.  
On the other hand, however, we found no support for our Hypothesis 4b, which predicted 
a similar mediating role for organizational legitimacy on the path connecting interorganizational 
arrangements with focal organizational performance. While interlocks, alliances, joint ventures 
and mergers and acquisitions all have the potential to improve focal organizational legitimacy, 
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there simply is no direct link between the latter construct and focal organizational performance. 
These results support a characterization of RDT as a sociological theory in which organizations 
are seen as being exposed to societal norms and expectations, and in which establishing social 
acceptability by meeting those demands is important in its own right (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In 
sum, our results for focal organizational legitimacy are at odds with a view of RDT as a theory of 
organizational performance.  
We conclude from these results that resource dependencies are simultaneously 
substantive pressures that can threaten focal organizational performance and symbolic pressures 
that can hurt organizational legitimacy when left unmitigated (cf. David et al., 2007; Oliver, 
1991b). However, several questions still remain. First, future research is needed to understand 
why there is no link between organizational legitimacy and organizational performance in the 
empirical context that is the domain of RDT. Prior studies argued for and occasionally 
established such a link in other contexts (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1999). At present, it 
is simply unclear why the legitimacy organizations gain by mitigating resource dependence 
pressures fails to be a catalyst for their financial performance. A possible answer might be that 
the type of legitimacy organizations gain by liaising with resource providers is institutional 
rather than strategic in kind (Suchman, 1995). Second, an exploration of the different types of 
interorganizational arrangements suggests that all types are differentially connected to 
performance. This suggests that, from a performance management perspective, the various 
arrangement types are imperfect substitutes (Hillman et al., 2009), and that more research is 
needed that explicitly compares these types in terms of their connections with organizational 
performance (cf. Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & Noorderhaven, 2002; Wang & Zajac, 2007). 
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The Impact of Competition Law 
Finally, our results show that competition law is an important boundary criterion for 
RDT. Our mixed-effects WLS regressions showed that the introduction of the Celler-Kefauver 
Act in 1950 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976 did not affect the prevalence or performance 
of interorganizational arrangements in the U.S. Although the former Act made anti-competitive 
action and subsequent monopoly rent appropriation more difficult by closing a loophole in the 
preceding Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, it did not explicitly forbid companies to acquire 
competitors’ assets as long as they were shrewd enough not to bid for the company as a whole. 
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act included the requirement to file an intended merger with both the 
Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, which is then 
followed by a 30-day waiting period during which these parties investigate the filing for anti-
competitive effects. This implied a new set of hurdles that a number of companies failed to 
overcome, but our results show that they did not negatively impact interorganizational 
arrangement formation or performance. 
However, our regression results showed that the New Horizontal Merger guidelines 
issued in 1992 did affect the relative prevalence and performance of interorganizational 
arrangements in the U.S. In terms of prevalence and in contrast to the effect predicted in 
Hypothesis 5a, the number of mergers and acquisitions that were initiated in response to resource 
dependence pressures in the post 1992 period did not decline, but remained stable (see Table 4). 
Yet the formation of interlocks, alliances, and joint ventures increased significantly during this 
window, thus providing support for Hypothesis 5b (see Table 4). In other words, U.S. 
corporations have since 1992 increasingly opted for alternative types of interorganizational 
arrangements. This is likely due to the fact that the New Horizontal Merger guidelines made 
anti-competitive action through mergers and acquisitions more difficult, as the Act propagated 
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the use of more sensitive methods for defining markets and for measuring market power. A 
similar, but inversed, story can be told about interorganizational arrangement profitability. In 
contrast to the logic of Hypothesis 6b, the performance of interlocks, alliances, and joint ventures 
has remained on par after 1992 (see Table 4). In the same period, however, the performance of 
mergers and acquisitions declined steeply (see Table 4). This finding lends support to Hypothesis 
6a. In combination, these results demonstrate that the tenability of RDT is dependent on the 
stringency of the anti-competitive regime in a certain context or time period: the more stringent 
the regime, the weaker the potential of RDT to predict organizational behavior. 
These findings have two clear implications for future research. First, since the U.S. is 
home to some of the earliest and arguably strongest institutions in the area of modern anti-trust 
law, any test of RDT in the U.S. context is likely to be conservative. Future comparative 
international studies are therefore needed to explore whether RDT has greater explanatory power 
in regions with less stringent antitrust provisions, such as large parts of Asia and Latin America, 
and certain parts of Europe, especially countries outside the European Union.  
Second, even in this day and age antitrust law is predominantly focused on mergers and 
acquisitions, whereas our results show that stricter antitrust legislation might create substitution 
effects with other types of arrangements, such as interlocks, alliances and joint ventures. This 
seems to suggest that firms are abandoning mergers and acquisitions as their primary vehicles for 
collusion and anticompetitive action. Instead, they seem to be turning towards interlocks, 
alliances, and joint ventures as a means for tacit coordination, likely knowing full well that these 
arrangements are more difficult to police for frequently overburdened antitrust authorities. 
Future studies are therefore needed to assess whether the performance-enhancing attributes of 
other interorganizational arrangement types, and in particular interlocks, alliances, and joint 
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ventures, are not at least in part due to their potential to increase market power and coordinate 
competition-reducing actions. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 We test these hypotheses on a subsample which only includes U.S.-based observations, because 
U.S. samples are most prominently represented in our dataset, and because antitrust legislation is 
jurisdiction-specific. Because in-sourcing was the least prevalent type of arrangement in the U.S. 
during our observation window, we use it as our reference category (we code for arrangement 
type with dummy variables). It can therefore not be included in Hypotheses 5b and 6b. 
2 Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations are calculated as follows: 





−
+
=
r
rzr 1
1ln
2
1 , where r is the 
untransformed correlation coefficient.   
3 The reported values are standardized Betas, not effect sizes; this implies that a unit of change in 
the independent variable is expected to be accompanied by a unit of change in the dependent 
variable. 
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Table 1 
Definitions and Operationalizations of Variables 
Construct Definition Operationalization 
Resource 
dependence 
The extent to which a focal organization depends on resources controlled 
by nominally independent parties in its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  
Power 
imbalance 
“[T]he difference in the 
power of each actor over the 
other” (Casciaro & Piskorski, 
2005: 170).  
Complementary resource need, measured 
by those operational resources that new 
firms often do not have but require to be 
viable (Katila, Rosenberger & Eisenhardt, 
2008). Organizational ownership by other 
parties (Ellstrand et al., 2002; Peng, 
2004). The difference between two actors’ 
dependencies, or the ratio of the power of 
the more powerful actor to that of the less 
powerful actor, e.g. buyer supplier 
relations (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).  
Mutual 
dependence 
“[T]he existence of bilateral 
dependencies in the dyad, 
regardless of whether the two 
actors’ dependencies are 
balanced or imbalanced” 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 
The sum, or the average of actor i’s 
dependence on actor j and actor j’s 
dependence on actor i (Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005); The proportion of 
industry i’s total transactions that were 
with industry j (Finkelstein, 1997). 
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170).  
Board 
interlock 
The service of a director on 
multiple boards, creating a 
connection between a focal 
and another organization (e.g. 
Peng, 2004; Yeo, Pochet, & 
Alcouffe, 2003). 
 
Representation on important university 
committees or affiliated directors (Peng, 
2004; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 
Alliance A collaborative agreement 
between two or more firms, 
which contribute resources to 
a common endeavor of 
potentially important 
competitive consequences, 
while maintaining their 
individuality (Gulati, 1998). 
Formation of an alliance in a given year 
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Katila et al., 
2008). 
Joint venture A distinct organizational 
entity set up to jointly 
develop a product or share 
technology, generally 
involving an equity 
investment (Ahuja, 2000). 
Number of collaborations set up to 
develop a product or share technology 
(Ahuja, 2000). 
 
In-sourcing Acquiring resources to Depth of the level of integration (Cording, 
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supplement in-house 
capabilities (Lacity & 
Willcocks, 1998); partial 
acquisition of a resource from 
another organization, and/or 
acquiring resources out of the 
market for in-house capability 
development (ibid). 
Christmann & King, 2008); a dummy 
variable given the value (1) if a subsidiary 
receives a corporate investment in a 
funding round (Katila et al., 2008). 
 
Merger and 
acquisition 
The absorption of all 
resources (assets and 
liabilities) of a target firm, in 
exchange for assets or stocks, 
so that a new firm is being 
created (Brealey, Myers, & 
Allan, 2006).  
Note: we use the terms 
merger and acquisition 
interchangeably. 
Number of acquisitions or mergers taking 
place over time, measured as a count 
variable (e.g. Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; 
Heeley, King & Covin, 2006). 
 
Organizational 
legitimacy 
“[A] generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed 
Firm status (Haunschild & Beckman, 
1998; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007); 
association with a large number of 
powerful partners in terms of their 
centrality in the network (Hagedoorn & 
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system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman, 1995: 547). 
Duysters, 2002).  
Organizational 
autonomy 
“[A]n organization’s freedom 
to make its own decisions 
about the use and allocation 
of its internal resources 
without reference or regard to 
the demands or expectations 
of potential linkage partners” 
(Oliver, 1991a: 944-945). 
A firm that can better deal with payment 
problems (Peng and Luo, 2000); 
independence from government (Peng and 
Luo, 2000); management-controlled (as 
opposed to founder-controlled) firms 
(Stearns and Mizruchi, 1986); subunit 
power, measured on a 7-point scale 
ranging from a great deal to very little 
power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974); cash 
on hand, to offset dependence on creditors 
(Uzzi, 1999).  
Organizational 
performance 
The extent to which organizations generate accounting-based profits or 
increase their overall market value (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) 
Accounting-
based 
performance 
The extent to which 
organizations generate 
accounting-based performance 
(e.g. Peng & Luo, 2000; 
Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). 
Return on Assets (Judge & Zeithaml, 
1992); Return on Investment (Bae & 
Gargiulo, 2004); Return on Equity. 
Market-based 
performance 
The extent to which 
organizations increase their 
Increase in market to book value 
(Ruigrok, Peck & Keller, 2006); Tobin’s 
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overall market value. Q (Anderson & Reeb, 2004); Growth rate 
of retained earnings (Luo, 2008). 
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Table 2 
HOMA Results, Meta-Analytic Correlation Tablea 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
13 
1. Resource 
dependence 
 
111,601 264,853 72,739 63,883 168,165 326,872 79,635 47,610 186,091 48,480 223,653 148,750 
149 237 116 54 180 340 87 75 189 35 108 203 
2. Interlock .17*** 
 
114595 31,084 268 39,107 78,455 14,871 5,127 65,419 18,484 83,978 67,950 
.02 30 8 2 32 89 31 15 52 18 22 72 
3. Alliance .08*** .19*** 
 
84,744 27,970 46,646 173,819 32,890 35,886 121,226 13,092 182,328 136,172 
.01 .03 100 23 68 153 27 54 97 13 87 134 
4. Joint venture .11*** .07 .20*** 
 
7,960 55,504 76,572 7,960 21,070 53,880 8,320 43,658 46,930 
.02 .04 .03 18 75 130 21 33 73 17 26 68 
5. In-sourcing .08 -.08 .06 .04 
 
28,995 51,955 23,267 5,897 26,602 1,726 19,083 42,034 
.05 .06 .05 .05 40 40 8 9 22 3 15 23 
6. Merger and 
acquisition 
.08*** .08* .15*** .25*** .13** 
 
289,619 79,264 17,361 137,544 89,551 54,830 155,159 
.02 .03 .04 .05 .04 234 38 30 119 48 51 113 
7. Organizational  
performance 
.04** .02 .17*** .08*** .00 .04*** 
 
137,607 34,967 191,978 108,276 116,616 178,752 
.01 .02 .01 .01 .03 .01 135 65 199 64 49 183 
8. Organizational 
legitimacy 
.12*** .09* .23*** .10 .01 .10** .19*** 
 
18,547 58,976 16,387 26,502 52,862 
.02 .04 .04 .06 .02 .03 .03 19 57 9 13 44 
9. Organization 
age 
.02 .06 .06*** .09** .10* .16* .08* .02 
 
27,124 3,604 16,123 25,851 
.03 .05 .02 .03 .05 .07 .03 .03 43 4 22 58 
10. Organization 
size 
.08*** .21*** .16*** .16*** .09*** .11*** .07*** .08*** .19*** 
 
34,184 84,721 120,364 
.01 .02 .02 .03 .02 .02 .02 .02 .03 27 44 120 
11. Debt/equity 
ratio 
.00 .06 .02 .03 -.01 .01 -.03 -.00 .01 .06 
 
31,998 61,604 
.02 .04 .03 .03 .02 .01 .04 .04 .07 .04 9 28 
12. Prior ties .07*** .11*** .21*** .06** .03 .06** .06*** .15*** .08*** .10*** .01 
 
84,366 
.02 .03 .02 .02 .06 .02 .02 .03 .03 .02 .01 49 
13. Organization 
autonomy 
.15*** .11*** .19*** .05 .08* .06* .06*** .11*** .12** .08*** -.01 .09***  
.02 .03 .02 .03 .04 .02 .02 .03 .04 .02 .04 .01  
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a Cells below the diagonal contain mean correlations (mean ρ) and standard deviations (s.d.ρ). Cells 
above the diagonal contain the total number of observations (N) and number of samples (k). Mean effect 
sizes marked with an asterix (*) are statistically significant, where * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, 
suggesting the presence of moderator variables. 
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Table 3 
MASEM Resultsa 
 Interlock Alliance Joint Venture In-sourcing M&A 
Organizational 
Autonomy 
Organizational 
Legitimacy 
Substantive 
Performance 
Resource Dependence .08*** .08*** .07*** .15*** .09*** .20*** .27*** .02 
(15.92) (6.08) (9.59) (7.97) (7.18) (12.24) (9.83) (0.96) 
Organization Age .00 .01* .02*** .08*** .08*** .07*** -.01 .06*** 
 (1.53) (2.13) (6.09) (9.17) (14.56) (9.74) (-0.89) (6.35) 
Organization Size .04*** .07*** .04*** .06*** .04*** .01 .03* .03*** 
 (20.20) (14.49) (14.67) (7.19) (7.36) (1.08) (2.35) (2.90) 
Prior Ties .02*** .16*** .02*** .02*** .03***    
 (8.27) (20.80) (4.22) (4.22) (4.22)    
Debt/equity ratio      -.03 -.03 -.08*** 
      (-1.82) (-1.10) (-3.97) 
Interlock 
     
.19*** .13* -.13*** 
(5.99) (2.38) (-3.05) 
Alliance 
     
.21*** .45*** .21*** 
(17.62) (21.91) (12.72) 
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a Note: GFI = goodness of fit; RMR Root Mean Residual; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
Joint Venture 
     
-.01 .14*** .09*** 
(-0.70) (3.78) (3.14) 
In-sourcing 
     
.04*** -.03 -.02 
(5.64) (-2.05) (-1.96) 
M&A 
     
.00 .12*** -.02 
(-0.40) (5.60) (-0.97) 
Organizational Autonomy 
     
 
 
.12*** 
(15.95) 
Organizational Legitimacy 
     
 
 
.02 
(1.29) 
Degrees of Freedom 19        
Harmonic mean N 9,840        
X2 1,755.67        
GFI .98        
Standardized RMR 
RMR 
.04 
.00     
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Table 4 
Results of Mixed-Effects WLS Regressiona 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Public organization 
Manufacturing industry 
.04 (.03) 
.03 (.03) 
.05 (.03)* 
.02 (.03) 
.03 (.02) 
-.03 (.02) 
.05 (.02)* 
-.06 (.02)** 
Technology industry 
Services industry 
.06 (.03)* 
-.06 (.05) 
.03 (.03) 
-.06 (.05) 
.15 (.02)*** 
-.06 (.02) 
.13 (.02)*** 
-.06 (.04) 
Celler Kefauver Act     
Interlock  -.04 (.05)  -.09 (.05) 
Alliance     
JV     
M&A  .03 (.05)  -.04 (.05) 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act     
Interlock  .04 (.04)  -.02 (.03) 
Alliance  .07 (.04)  .03 (.03) 
JV  .05 (.05)  .03 (.04) 
M&A  .04 (.04)  -.05 (.03) 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines      
Interlock  .19 (.07)**  .05 (.05) 
Alliance  .11 (.05)*  -.02 (.03) 
JV  .10 (.05)*  -.01 (.03) 
M&A  .05 (.05)  -.12 (.03)*** 
     
Power Imbalance .02 (.02) .02 (.02)   
Market Based Performance   .01 (.05) .01 (.02) 
Single measurement -.06 (.07) -.05 (.05) .02 (.05) .02 (.05) 
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SMJ 
ASQ 
AMJ 
JMS 
OS 
.00 (.04) 
.06 (.04) 
.05 (.04) 
.07 (.05) 
-.08 (.04) 
.01 (.04) 
.09 (.04)* 
.03 (.04) 
.04 (.05) 
-.07 (.04) 
-.03 (.02) 
.05 (.03) 
-.14 (.02)*** 
-.03 (.03) 
-.11 (.03)*** 
.00 (.02) 
.09 (.03) 
-.11 (.03)*** 
-.03 (.04) 
-.10 (.03)*** 
     
Cross-sectional design .01 (.03) .02 (.03) .10 (.02)*** .11 (.02)*** 
Survey dummy 
Publication type 
Publication year 
Organizational legitimacy 
 
Constant 
-.01 (.03) 
-.03 (.05) 
-.01 (.00)*** 
 
 
16.65 (2.75)*** 
-.03 (.03) 
-.01 (.05) 
-.01 (.00)*** 
 
 
19.62 (3.05)*** 
.06 (.02)** 
.11 (.03)*** 
.01 (.00)*** 
.10 (.02)*** 
 
-10.634 (2.86)*** 
.06 (.03)** 
.10 (.03)*** 
.01 (.00)*** 
.09 (.02)*** 
 
-13.81 (3.19)*** 
Mean effect size .10 .10 .07 .07 
R2 0.23 0.25 .33 .39 
K 448 448 510 510 
QModel (p) 132.79 (.00) 156.43 (.00) 293.92 (.00) 350.51 (.00) 
QResidual (p) 448.27 (.28) 460.03 (.10) 608.08 (.00) 548.49 (.02) 
V .03 .03 .01 .01 
 a Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses. k is the 
total number of effect sizes; Q is the homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; v is the 
random effects variance component.   
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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